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A theorem is proved which states that no classical key generating protocol could
ever be provably secure. Consequently, candidates for provably secure protocols must
rely on some quantum effect. Theorem relies on the fact that BB84 Quantum key
distribution protocol has been proven secure.
PACS numbers: 05.40.-a, 02.50.Ng, 03.67.Dd
One of the central problems of cryptography is the
problem of establishing a secret key by two parties which
do not share any previous secret. This problem appears
very often in practice, for example when an anonymous
buyer wants to safely pass its credit card number to a
web shop, or when a secure computer communication is
to be established using ssh or https protocols, etc.
As proved by Shannon on a purely logical basis,
two parties, let’s name them Alice and Bob, can not
establish any secret by a public discussion based on a
publicly known protocol [1]. Nevertheless, in practice,
Alice and Bob can still establish a useful common
secret (key) and there are two general approaches to
do that: computationally secure and unconditionally
secure protocols. With computationally secure protocols
such as the Diffie-Hellman protocol [3] Alice and Bob
can compute their key easily (quickly) while Eve,
who has all the information to do the same, faces
practically insurmountable but in principle solvable
computational problem. All key establishing protocols
in wider use today are of that type. Computationally
secure protocols are based on NP complete problems
but unfortunately no such problem has been proved to
be hard, in the sense of the complexity theory. The
DH protocol is ”classic” in a sense that it operates
with no reference to quantum mechanics. It is gov-
erned by a pure mathematics and consequently can be
performed on a Turing machine. Alice and Bob, for
example, could be two memory locations in an ordi-
nary computer (or computers). When we use ”Secure
Shell” program to access some distant computer via
a secured channel, this is exactly what Alice and Bob are.
By modifying the Shannon’s model of a crypto-system,
information-theoretically secure (i.e. provable uncondi-
tionally secure) systems become possible [2]. In such
systems an adversary simply does not have the necessary
information to calculate the key. To make that possi-
ble, two modifications are necessary. Firstly, instead of
requiring that the key established by legitimate parties
is statistically independent of the information which (at
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best) an adversary can obtain, we allow for an arbitrarily
small correlation between the two. Secondly, we require
that the adversary can not obtain exactly the same infor-
mation as the legitimate users. Provability comes with a
price tag: Alice and Bob now must interact (more than
once) in order to establish the secret key.
The non-existence theorem
Examples of information-theoretically secure protocols
are: BB84 [4], B92 [5] and EPR [6]. In particular,
security of BB84 has been proven in [7, 8]. Neither of
these protocols can be entirely performed on a Turing
machine because they assume a quantum channel. Such
a channel is something rather exclusive. Almost all of
contemporary computing technology and communication
infrastructure is classical. Furthermore, in the absence
of practical quantum repeaters, quantum channel is the
main cause of severely limited range of the QKD [9]. It
is therefore legitimate to ask whether there is any clas-
sical IT secure protocol. The answer to that is found in
the Theorem 1. below, but first we need three definitions.
Definition 1. Classical communication channel is
a device which has one input and at least two outputs
such that perfect copies of the information sent to the
input appear at the outputs.
Definition 2. A protocol is said to be classical if it
assumes only classical channels and can be performed
on a Turing machine.
Definition 3. A key establishing protocol is said
to be information-theoretically secure if it allows two
legitimate parties, who do not share a secret initially, to
establish with a high probability a common string (key)
about which an adversary has only partial knowledge
limited by the upper bound known to (but not necessar-
ily under control of) the legitimate parties.
For example the BB84 protocol followed by the
information reconciliation [4] forms an information-
theoretically secure protocol. This definition is slightly
weaker then the more common one which requires the
legitimate parties to be able to limit the adversaries
2knowledge about the key to an arbitrarily small fraction
of the key. However, the two are almost equivalent.
Namely, any protocol which fits the Definition 3 can
be complemented with the privacy amplification [10]
in order to satisfy the stronger definition, whereas any
protocol that satisfies the stronger definition trivially
satisfies the weaker one. We are now ready to prove the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. Two parties initially sharing no secret
can not establish a common string about which an ad-
versary has only partial knowledge by a purely classical
protocol.
Other, more colloquial formulation of the theorem
might be: ”All information-theoretically secure key
establishing protocols (in both weak and strong sense)
are quantum protocols.”.
Proof. Imagine the situation as in Fig 1 where Alice
and Bob are connected with one classical and one quan-
tum channel so that they can perform BB84 protocol.
Additionally, they are connected with channel(s) neces-
sary to perform another information-theoretically secure
protocol named T. We assume that T is a classical pro-
tocol and prove, by reductio ad absurdum, that this can
not be true.
T
Eve
quantum ch.
classic ch.
classic ch.
classic ch.
Alice Bob
FIG. 1: Alice and Bob can run BB84 protocol using one
quantum and one classical channel. Alternatively they can
run the same protocol after replacing the quantum channel
with protocol T. (Setup for proving Theorem 1.)
In the setup in Fig 1, Eve is familiar with both
BB84 and T protocols and can make perfect copies of
information going through all classical channels con-
nected to Alice and Bob, and is free to make attempts
to tamper with the quantum channel. In order to
establish a common secret key Alice and Bob perform
BB84 protocol using the quantum channel and the
public channel (we assume BB84 protocol with polarized
photons). Each of them has a local non-deterministic
random bit generator. This protocol goes like this:
1. Alice generates two bits in order to encode one of
the 4 possible polarizations of photon whereas Bob
generates one bit in order to choose one of the two
polarizers;
2. Alice sends polarized photon to Bob;
3. At that moment Eve who is tampering with the
quantum channel tries to find out which photon
state has been emitted by Alice but she can not
obtain full information because of no-cloning theo-
rem;
4. Bob receives the photon and measures it with his
polarizer. The result r is interpreted as ”0” or ”1”,
according to the BB84 specification;
5. Bob sends to Alice the code of his polarizer, that
is the bit he generated in the step 1, through the
public channel;
6. If Bob’s polarizer matched photon polarization
(meaning the measurement of the polarization was
correct), Alice sends ”OK” and the bit r is kept by
both Alice and Bob, otherwise it is discarded.
7. Alice and Bob repeat steps 1 through 6 any number
of times to obtain each a string of desired length.
8. When the desired string length is reached, Alice
anb Bob perform information reconciliation, which
results in the final shared key.
This protocol is information-theoretically secure. Its
security relies entirely on the fact that Eve can not
make a perfect copy of state emitted by Alice in the
step 3 of each round, because no-cloning theorem [11]
of Quantum Mechanics applies to the quantum channel.
However if the protocol T is secure then Alice and Bob
can replace the quantum channel with T and perform a
similar protocol in the following way:
1. Alice generates two random bits, Bob generates one
random bit;
2. Alice, instead of generating a photon simply sends
her two bits to Bob using classical protocol T;
3. At that moment Eve is listening to the protocol T
but she can not obtain full information because T
is information-theoretically secure;
4. Bob receives the bits from Alice, and calculates
what he would measure in the case that Alice did
send him a real photon and he used real polarizer
according to his previously generated bit. The re-
sult r is interpreted as ”0” or ”1”, according to the
BB84 specification.
5. Bob sends to Alice the code of his ”polarizer” that
is the bit he generated in the step 1 through the
public channel;
6. If Bob’s bit matched photon polarization code
(meaning the measurement of the polarization
would be correct), Alice sends ”OK” and the bit
r is kept by both Alice and Bob, otherwise it is
discarded.
37. Alice and Bob repeat steps 1 through 6 any number
of times to obtain each a string of desired length.
8. When the desired string length is reached, Alice
anb Bob perform information reconciliation, which
results in the final shared key.
This protocol also makes possible for Alice and Bob to
obtain a partially secret key. But it differs from the first
protocol only by the fact that the quantum channel in
the step 3. has been replaced by a classical protocol T.
This in turn means that the effect of quantum channel
in BB84 can be achieved entirely in terms of the classical
protocol T which can not be true because no-cloning
theorem does not have a classical explanation, Q.E.D.
Another way to prove the Theorem 1 would be to show
that an unknown quantum state could be cloned with a
help of a classical information-theoretically secure proto-
col.
1. SKAPD PROTOCOL AND THE
NON-EXISTENCE THEOREM
It is the question of how the Theorem 1 relates to the
SKAPD protocol of Maurer [12] which is widely referred
to being classical.
Alice Bob
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FIG. 2: Maurer’s ”Secret Key Agreement by Public Discus-
sion” (SKAPD) protocol
Maurer’s protocol consists of three ”phases” during
which Alice and Bob (and possibly Eve) communi-
cate over classical channels. Each phase (advantage
distillation, information reconciliation and privacy
amplification) is purely classical and can be performed
on a Turing machine. Therefore it is tempting to think
of it as being ”classical”. But, the three phases alone
are not sufficient for establishing the key: they can not
even begin without Alice and Bob (and Eve) having
their initial binary strings. We are therefore coerced
to conclude that there is another hidden but crucial
”0-th” phase. In the Maurer’s ”satellite scenario” (Fig
2) a satellite S emanates a weak signal of a random
binary string, S0. Alice, Bob and Eve are ”connected”
to the satellite by separate channels in order to obtain
three different (but largely overlapping) copies of a
binary string. Each of the parties uses its own copy
to perform subsequent phases. Crucial requirement
in the 0-th phase is that Eve can not copy (without
errors) the information that is sent to either Alice or
Bob. This means that, by definition, Alice and Bob
are not connected to the satellite by classical channels.
Further requirement is that the satellite sends a very
weak signal such that Eve is not able to receive faithful
copy of S0 (in which case Alice and Bob have a zero
chance of establishing the key). This requirement
pushed to its extreme, by allowing Eve to have better
and better receiving antenna, would eventually lead
to the requirement that the satellite should only send
one quantum of electromagnetic radiation at a time,
thus apparently realizing quantum channels with Alice,
Bob and Eve. One possible model of this low-power
communication is that the satellite encodes zeros and
ones with quantum states (polarizations) just the way
Alice does in the BB84. But instead of sending only
one photon per bit, it sends many photons of the same
state (per bit) in all directions so that every participant
would be able to receive multiple copies of the same
state. Having received multiple copies corresponding to
a given bit, parties would be able to measure the state
but still not with absolute certainty. At the end, parties
would obtain similar but not equal copies of the initial
string S0, which is exactly what is required. Even more
interesting is the fact that the security of this phase
(in the present model) clearly comes from the quantum
effects but not from the no-cloning theorem because
no-cloning theorem applies only to single measurement
of an unknown state whereas here one is allowed to
perform multiple measurements.
Scenarios other than the ”satellite scenario” have also
been worked out: for example digitizing of a publicly
announced patch of the Moon’s surface, or listening to a
known weak radio source in deep Space, but no scenario
is known in which zeroth phase is purely classical.
To conclude, existence of the information-theoretically
secure SKAPD protocol by itself does not contradict the
Theorem 1.
An additional support for the Theorem 1 comes from
the recent work of [13] where striking equality has been
found in noise thresholds for a family of quantum key-
generating protocols and the SKAPD protocol indicating
that these protocols might have more in common than
previously realized.
Discussion
It could be argued that since we live in the quantum
world all practical protocols are necessarily quantum.
However, this is not what the Theorem 1 is about. The-
orem 1 states that is is impossible to even imagine an
information-theoretically secure protocol that would rely
only on notion of classical channels and Turing machines.
4And since today communications and computers are to a
very high degree classical, it means that they are unsuit-
able for information-theoretically secure key establish-
ing protocols. Theorem 1 spells out a simple principle:
information-theoretically secure protocols must rely on
some quantum effect, but not necessarily the no-cloning
theorem.
Conclusion
By virtue of the Theorem 1 no classical key generating
protocol could ever be proven secure. To illustrate this it
has been shown that a provably secure protocol SKAPD,
previously thought to be classical, is in fact not entirely
classical. On the other hand, quantum protocols which
have been proven secure so far are very impractical be-
cause of limited range, expensive gadgetry and generally
non-existing infrastructure of quantum channels needed
to support them on a wider scale. While some of these
limitations could be overcame with further technological
development, we hope that the Theorem 1 would inspire
new ideas for more practical quantum protocols.
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